Corporate Venture Capital is seemingly everywhere — from Intel’s venture capital arm ranking as the #1 venture capital firm for funded deals over the last decade, to the massive hoopla surrounding Google forming a 100mm venture capital fund last May to invest in virtually any sector they see fit. In the current economic environment where 1) VC money is tight and 2) the IPO market (although marginally improved) is still quite bad, startups are increasingly taking a serious look at corporate venture capital as a fund raising solution, especially if it is the only money available to them. Anecdotally, over the last six months a large percentage of my VC-style deals have been driven by corporate or strategic VC.
For example, I helped one large “consumer goods” business seed four different high technology start-ups last quarter and also helped a different corporate VC untangle a purchase option its baby company was no longer happy with. Right now, I am working on raising a new $100mm VC fund that is targeting LPs among large companies in a particular sector and that is designed to give these large company strategic LPs a first look at its portfolio companies and their technologies. Below I give more details on the pros and cons of taking corporate venture capital. Large companies are intrigued by the siren call of venture investments. It allows them to “outsource” their R&D efforts without having to get in bed with the innovators they are seeding. They look at the relationship more as a strategic partnership then a financial play. You could say that the focus is on “partnering” rather than “venturing.” The big companies are focused on finding synergies – how can the baby company with the promising technology fill some gap in our product portfolio, or accelerate our time to market? The value to the big company is not calculated purely in terms of hard cash – rather it is also calculated in terms of the overall business proposition. The big company investor will often expect an option on the company it invests in or on the technology the target is developing. However, they typically do not want “control” of the baby companies at the outset. They prefer to make minority investments – and often will couple these with a license right or purchase option. By making a minority investment and not actually acquiring the baby company, the big company may be able to avoid or delay having to consolidate the baby company’s financials with its own – depending on its analysis of FIN 46.That the big company does not want to acquire the baby company outright can be a good thing for the owner’s of the baby company. For one thing, they may get to defer the sale of their company until a later date when, presumably, they will have hit their milestones and will have a much higher valuation. Also, it allows the baby company to have a champion – hopefully, in an industry or sector that the baby company can really use a champion.
I have seen this work very successfully in the biotech space and also in certain hardware sectors – knowing that you have someone at big pharma already interested in your company can give you some peace of mind and allow you to focus on your clinical trials. The flip side of this is that you may end up discouraging any other potential partners from coming forward – which will not only seriously chill any auction process for the sale of your company or technology, but might also be an impediment to basic business success. Close ties with one big client can hurt a baby company if the partnership with big company A will prevent you from doing business with their competitor, big company B. Another thing to keep in mind is that the terms of your technology license or purchase option with the big company will typically be locked in at the very beginning. The terms of this arrangement may seem great when all you have is an idea; however, once you have traction and have hit several milestones, you may not like the pre-established price or the terms of the license. Maybe you could do better in the open market? Maybe you don’t want to sell at all anymore and the big company is exercising its purchase option? These are certainly perils. A baby company has few legal options at this point and may end up with the Hobson’s choice of taking the deal that is available or taking none at all – and potentially killing the company. A final thing to consider is that big companies are typically slower than independent VCs in cementing their deals. In a sector where speed to market is very important – such as consumer e-commerce or social media – this is a serious disadvantage. Corporate venture capital is not without its risks, but for the right baby company, can be the right choice.